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For all their rhetoric about free markets, the Thatcher Treasuries picked a winner in the 
1980s: the financial sector. That winner has been backed ever since. Decisions taken by 
Thatcher’s Treasuries effectively abandoned the regions and their industries, while greatly 
benefiting finance in the south east. The Treasury has not been passive in the rise of UK 
finance, and it cannot be passive in the ‘rebalancing’ that politicians now claim to want. It 
needs to pick, and make, other winners.  
 
British finance has long been dominant over British industry, even at the height of the 
industrial revolution, and while this relative weakness did not always place industry at great 
disadvantage, it was never the favoured child. Throughout the 20th century, British 
governments tolerated large trade deficits resulting from policies that supported the City’s 
role as an international clearing house. The Treasury’s political commitment to tighter 
budgets and the foundations of the post-war economy, agreed at Bretton Woods, drew the 
City, the Bank of England and the Treasury close together. But By the 1970s, British industry 
was ailing in the face of foreign competition, and (with the exception of the arms sector) 
state interventionism was neither a coherent strategy nor consistently applied. The inflation 
and currency crises of the 1970s proved pivotal points at which the British state capitulated 
to international financial pressures and relinquished some of its policy autonomy, in part to 
maintain the City’s position among the world’s leading financial centres.  
 
Even against this background, Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 brought real and radical 
change. Repeated state interventions propelled finance while industry was left to its own 
devices. Although the groundwork for monetarism had been laid by the Labour 
government’s acceptance of the terms of the IMF’s loan in 1976, the high interest rates that 
accompanied Geoffrey Howe’s aggressive and explicit monetarism strengthened sterling 
and made borrowing for capital dear. This hurt physical manufacturers and especially 
exporters, all the while making British finance comparatively more powerful. Howe was the 
first chancellor to persistently champion small shareholders and the individual investor, 
groups whose characterisation became a significant part of the Treasury’s pro-finance public 
relations. In his budget speeches he spoke of industry only one-third as often as his 
predecessor, Denis Healey, had. Although Howe’s successor, Nigel Lawson, cut corporation 
tax from 52 per cent to 35 per cent, this was explicitly paid for by removing capital 
investment allowances for machinery and plant, measures which hit industry but not 
finance. Similarly, the Treasury raised general VAT rates on basic goods and services, while 
finance and insurance services were VAT-exempt. The signals from the top of the Treasury 
showed that industry mattered less and finance more.  
 
The activist Thatcher Treasuries directly oversaw or heavily influenced a slew of other pro-
finance changes. Among Howe’s first acts were exchange and dividend control reforms, for 
which the City had lobbied for years. The liberalisation of hire purchase and personal credit 
were free market Treasury initiatives, accomplished through profit-taking financial firms. 
The Treasury also reduced stamp duty on the purchase of shares and bonds, from two per 
cent down to 0.5 per cent. The negotiations for the liberalisation of the London Stock 
Exchange – most unwelcome in that closed shop – took years of effort by Thatcher’s team 
to achieve, and it turbo-charged the stock exchange when it abolished many of the barriers 
between financial investing and banking in 1986. London’s equity markets developed a 
much larger turnover, and the lower profits for gilt dealers meant that they became more 
speculative to make up their shortfall. In the newly-created futures markets, the banks 
became dominant over other brokers and were now able to ‘short’ the cash markets, and 
the gilt and securities markets underwent a merger-and-acquisition phase. In a speech in 
1986, the chairman of Wood Gundy, Ian Steers, named “a positive and welcoming 
government attitude” as one of the City of London’s “natural” advantages. He explained 
that “the infrastructure which is in place is so big and the number of people directly 
involved so large, that only a major change in government policy as to tax or regulation 
could cause the market to move.”  
 
Sir Nicholas Macpherson, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, has argued that free 
trade, a preference for the consumer, and opposition to protectionism and mercantilism 
were positions that reduced distortions, advanced competition, and marginalised special 
interest groups. Certainly the ‘protections’ removed from British industry in the 1980s did 
marginalise them, just as the series of ‘enhancements’ offered to British finance advanced 
competition between the two for capital, a competition that industry lost.  “To govern is to 
choose,” George Osborne is fond of saying, and indeed it is. For any sector to have any hope 
on ‘balancing’ finance in the UK’s future, that sector will have to be chosen too.  
